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According to J. J. Rousseau’s approach, Country indicates an implicit
agreement among individuals who constitute society and this agreement concretizes with
constitution. Individuals for realizing this agreement must give tax to the government.
However, individuals often cannot easily understand the direct and harmonized connection
between government services and tax matters. Also, tax has personal reduction and saving
potential in society, due to this potential, tax evasion is possible. This reality is very
important for a tax system, which is dependent on the act of declaration. It is imperative
that rigorous inspection of the tax inspection system occurs on a regular basis.
The main goal of tax inspection is to create a tax system that works
healthy and realizes the expected functions of taxation. If the government desires to
cover it growing financial needs, it will enact new taxes, expand the base of taxation, or
it will take preventative measures in order to eliminate tax evasion. The first two
methods limits are determined by economical or political situations. To eliminate tax
evasion a type of security can be applied in each case. Two of the most important aspects
of tax inspection are to dissuade the tax evader and to educate taxpayers that made
mistakes in preparing their taxes. In addition, it is important to eliminate illegal
economical actions, which can be very harmful for the national economic and financial
policies and to the domestic and international competition. It is also necessary to
provide fair taxation for all of the citizens based upon income. If tax inspection can be
evaluated within all of these functions, the importance of the Tax Inspectors Board can be
better understood by mainstream society.
1.The Measurements of Performance
The results of the Tax Inspectors
Board inspections between the years 1995-2003 are summarized in the table below:
YEARS |
NUMBER OF REPORTS
|
INSPECTED TAX BASE
|
REACHED DISCREPANCY IN TAX BASE
|
DIFFERENCE |
|
ACCEPT |
CRITIQUE |
TOTAL |
(Million TL) |
(Million TL) |
(%) |
1995 |
167 |
4.437 |
4.604 |
77.176.423 |
12.576.063 |
16% |
1996 |
120 |
4.278 |
4.398 |
227.116.344 |
31.886.128 |
14% |
1997 |
123 |
2.469 |
2.592 |
419.154.162 |
38.422.235 |
9% |
1998 |
58 |
4.116 |
4.174 |
714.904.254 |
184.860.388 |
26% |
1999 |
36 |
2.336 |
2.372 |
271.577.739 |
512.999.651 |
189% |
|
|
|
3.066 |
3.103 |
1.223.427.564 |
959.008.208 |
78% |
|
2001 |
68 |
2.491 |
2.559 |
3.858.514.398 |
11.787.795.735 |
306% |
|
2002 |
52 |
1.657 |
1.709 |
1.256.001.311 |
2.178.525.937 |
173% |
|
2003 |
25 |
1.216 |
1.241 |
4.518.510.334 |
9.649.903.506 |
214% |
TOTAL |
686 |
26.066 |
26.752 |
12.566.382.529 |
25.355.977.851 |
202% |
Tax Inspectors inspected 12.566
quadrillion TL tax base and determined a 202 % discrepancy in tax base between
1995-2003. The most important factors within the inspection numbers are the
number of active Tax Inspectors, taxpayer activity areas, and the large company
activity. If only the active Tax Inspectors are considered, the result’s of the
inspection can be seen in the following table between 1995-2003:
|
RESULTS
PER INSPECTOR |
|
YEARS |
ACTIVE TAX INSPECTOR NUMBERS |
INSPECTION NUMBER |
INSPECTED TAX BASE
(1.000 TL) |
REACHED DISCREPANCY IN TAX BASE
(1.000 TL) |
% DIFFERENCE |
|
1995 |
225 |
21 |
343.006.324 |
55.893.613 |
16% |
|
1996 |
159 |
28 |
1.428.404.679 |
200.541.685 |
14% |
|
1997 |
174 |
15 |
2.408.931.965 |
220.817.442 |
9% |
|
1998 |
166 |
25 |
4.306.652.133 |
1.113.616.795 |
26% |
|
1999 |
191 |
13 |
1.421.872.979 |
2.685.862.047 |
189% |
|
2000 |
175 |
18 |
6.991.014.651 |
5.480.046.903 |
78% |
|
2001 |
202 |
13 |
19.104.183.515 |
58.363.450.205 |
306% |
|
2002 |
211 |
8 |
5.952.612.850 |
10.324.767.474 |
173% |
|
2003 |
198 |
6 |
22.823.046.326 |
48.741.770.732 |
214% |
The conflict rate of Tax Inspector reports can be determined according
to “Pre- Reconciliation Commission” activity results. These results are summarized in
the table below:
|
YEARS |
CRITIQUE
REPORTS |
REPORTS THAT PRE-RECONCILIATION WAS REQUESTED BY TAXPAYER |
% RATE |
NUMBER OF
REPORTS
THAT PRE-RECONCILIATION WAS
REACHED |
% RATE |
TOTAL PRE-RECONCILATION RATE |
|
1995 |
4.177 |
4.061 |
97% |
3.295 |
81% |
79% |
|
1996 |
4.023 |
3.559 |
88% |
2.795 |
79% |
70% |
|
1997 |
2.388 |
2.123 |
89% |
1.675 |
79% |
70% |
|
1998 |
3.909 |
3.220 |
82% |
2.920 |
91% |
75% |
|
1999 |
2.215 |
1.654 |
75% |
1.390 |
84% |
63% |
|
2000 |
2.842 |
2.128 |
75% |
1.722 |
81% |
61% |
|
2001 |
1.650 |
1.068 |
65% |
855 |
80% |
52% |
|
2002 |
1.206 |
525 |
44% |
373 |
71% |
31% |
|
2003 |
985 |
460 |
47% |
287 |
62% |
29% |
|
TOTAL |
23.395 |
18.798 |
80% |
15.312 |
81% |
65% |
If this data is reviewed, 80% reports are going to pre-reconciliation,
out of this 86%, 81% are reached to pre-reconciliation. Consequently, 65% of all
reports written are settled by pre-reconciliation. The other 29% of these reports written
are sent to the court for settlement or are going to post-reconciliation, central
reconciliation, or should be paid during the trial period which proceeded
pre-reconciliation. According to tax law, the crime of tax fraud cannot be considered a
reconciliation matter.
The conflicted reports are observed carefully during the tax courts and
Council of State periods. Certain tax matters can be evaluated differently between the Tax
Inspectors Board and the Council of State.
2. External Performance Comparison
It is possible to make comparisons according to some data from the
Ministry of Finance’s annual reports. The findings of these inspection units are shown
graphically below according to inspected tax base and discrepancy in tax base between the
years of 1995-1999:
The inspection units’ working results according to productive power
can be evaluated with “inspected tax base per inspector” and “reached discrepancy in
tax base per inspector” criteria. The difficulty of the evaluation of data in this case
is the unit’s investigation of the Ministry’s internal units besides tax inspection other than
those from the Tax Inspectors Board. Therefore, it is almost impossible to determine
active productive power to spend tax inspection because there is no information about
appropriate productive power and days to the tax inspection and Ministry’s
investigation. Because of this, the graphic below are created without realizations
according to the permanent personnel in 1999:





© 2004 Tax Inspectors Board
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